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________________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 A.S. and Sallee Miller (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in 
Pennsylvania state court against GlaxoSmithKline LLC 
(“GSK”) claiming that its drug, Paxil, caused birth defects.  
GSK removed the case to the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court1 
remanded the case, finding that GSK was a citizen of 
Pennsylvania and therefore ineligible to remove the case.  
After remand, our Court decided Johnson v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013), in which we 
held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware.  Within thirty days 
of our decision, GSK re-removed the case.  This time, the 
District Court denied the motion to remand and certified its 
order for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b) to allow this Court to determine the propriety of re-
removal.  For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that the 
second removal was untimely, and we will reverse the order 
denying remand and direct that the District Court remand this 
case to state court.  
I 
 
 On September 30, 2011, A.S., who suffers from a 
congenital birth defect, and his mother, Sallee Miller, who 
                                              
1 Several district court judges entered orders in this case.  We 
will refer to the judges collectively as the “District Court.”   
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ingested Paxil while pregnant, sued GSK in the Philadelphia 
County Court of Common Pleas.  App. 82-84.  The complaint 
alleged that all parties were citizens of Pennsylvania.  App. 
53, 84-85.  GSK removed the case within thirty days of 
receipt of the complaint based upon diversity.  On Plaintiffs’ 
motion, the case was consolidated with a number of other 
Paxil cases before a district court judge who had previously 
held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania.  Consistent with 
that holding, the District Court remanded this case along with 
the other consolidated cases to state court, holding that GSK 
was a citizen of Pennsylvania and could not remove a case 
from Pennsylvania state court to federal court.  Patton ex rel. 
Daniels-Patton v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., CIV.A. 11-
5965, 2011 WL 6210724, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2011).  
The same judge also issued an opinion identical to Patton in 
Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
841 F. Supp. 2d 890 (E.D. Pa. 2011), which remanded 
twenty-one other Paxil cases to state court.  This case 
returned to state court on January 4, 2012.  A.S. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2:11-cv-6641 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 
2012). 
 
 On June 7, 2013, this Court issued Johnson, which 
held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware.  Johnson, 724 F.3d 
at 360.  In reaching that holding, this Court explicitly rejected 
the reasoning in Patton, Maldonado, and the District Court’s 
similar decision in  Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 
774 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 
 Less than thirty days after the Johnson decision, GSK 
filed a second notice of removal in this case and in eight other 
cases with the same procedural posture.  App. 29-48.  The 
various plaintiffs filed motions to remand, arguing that the 
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removal was untimely.  App. 319.  These motions yielded 
inconsistent opinions.  The first case holding that removal 
was proper was Guddeck v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 957 
F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  In Guddeck, the District 
Court noted that there was “no dispute that the parties are of 
diverse citizenship” after Johnson, that the amount-in-
controversy requirement was satisfied, and that GSK was not 
an in-state defendant.  Id. at 623.  Guddeck also held that 
Johnson established that the case was “erroneously 
remanded” after the first removal, Johnson “provided a new 
and different ground for a second notice of removal,” and 
GSK’s second “removal notice [was] simply effectuating 
what was a timely and proper first removal.”  Id. at 625-26.  
The District Court in this case adopted Guddeck’s reasoning 
and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.  App. 2-3. 
 
 After the rulings in Guddeck and this case, more 
judges in the Eastern District weighed in.  One denied remand 
in two of the nine cases presenting the same issue, relying on 
the reasoning in Guddeck.  See M.N. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., No. 2:13-cv-3695-RB, Dkt. 17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 
2013); I.C. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:13-cv-3681-
RB, Dkt. 22 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2013).  Two judges disagreed 
and granted the motions to remand.  See Cammarota ex rel. 
Hallock v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., CIV.A. 13-3677, 
2013 WL 4787305 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013), reconsideration 
denied, CIV.A. 13-3677, 2013 WL 6632523 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
16, 2013); Powell ex rel. Powell v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., CIV.A. 13-3693, 2013 WL 5377852 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
26, 2013). 
 
 After the District Court denied remand, this case was 
transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where 
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Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal the 
following question: whether a defendant may remove a case a 
second time based on diversity jurisdiction more than one 
year after the commencement of the case?  App. 4.  The 
District Court certified the question for appeal, which this 
Court accepted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 
II 
  
 This Court has jurisdiction to address not only the 
certified question but “any issue fairly included within the 
certified order,” Johnson, 724 F.3d at 345 (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted), and “may consider all grounds 
that might require reversal of the order from which the parties 
appeal.”  Doe v. Am. Red Cross, 14 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Thus, this interlocutory appeal requires this Court to 
determine whether removal was proper and whether the order 
denying remand was correct.  As this appeal raises only legal 
issues, our review is de novo.  Ario v. Underwriting Members 
of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 
277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III 
 
 We will first review the removal provisions at issue.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), defendants may generally remove 
civil actions from state court to federal district court so long 
as the district court would have had subject-matter 
jurisdiction had the case been originally filed before it.2  
                                              
2 Section 1441(a) provides: 
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When a case is removable under § 1441(a), and a plaintiff 
seeks remand, the plaintiff must identify a provision that 
prohibits removal.  Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 
538 U.S. 691, 695-96 (2003).  “[R]emoval statutes ‘are to be 
strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of remand.’”  Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Steel Valley Auth. 
v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
 
 Plaintiffs contend that GSK’s most recent removal did 
not comply with the time limits for removal set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b).3  Section 1446(b) contains two paragraphs, 
the first of which provides: 
The notice of removal of a civil action or 
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after 
the receipt by the defendant, through service or 
                                                                                                     
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act 
of Congress, any civil action brought in a State 
court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 
the district court of the United States for the 
district and division embracing the place where 
such action is pending. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
3 Because this case was commenced in 2011, all citations to § 
1446 are to the version in effect during 2011.  Section 
1446(b) was amended by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011.  The amended version 
applies to cases commenced after January 6, 2012.   
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otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading 
setting forth the claim for relief upon which 
such action or proceeding is based, or within 
thirty days after the service of summons upon 
the defendant if such initial pleading has then 
been filed in court and is not required to be 
served on the defendant, whichever period is 
shorter. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  The second paragraph is an exception 
to the first paragraph.  Id.  It provides: 
 
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not 
removable, a notice of removal may be filed 
within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, 
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an 
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 
from which it may first be ascertained that the 
case is one which is or has become removable, 
except that a case may not be removed on the 
basis of [diversity jurisdiction] more than 1 year 
after commencement of the action.   
 
Id.   
 
 Plaintiffs also claim that the order denying remand 
violated 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  That section provides that 
“[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it 
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Though the statutory text is ostensibly 
broad in scope, the Supreme Court has not read it literally.  It 
has held that § 1447(d) only bars review of orders that 
remand cases pursuant to § 1447(c), which addresses remand 
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based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in 
the removal process.  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 
U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (“[O]nly remands based on grounds 
specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 
1447(d).” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Feidt v. Owens 
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“Section 1447(c) provides for remand on the basis of either a 
procedural defect or lack of jurisdiction . . . .”).  If remand 
was based on either of those grounds, then review of the order 
is barred under § 1447(d).  Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
729 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 
 For the reasons set forth herein, GSK’s re-removal is 
prohibited by § 1446(b) and remand is required.   
 
A 
 
 GSK argues that § 1446(b)’s first paragraph does not 
bar its second removal because it does “not impose any time 
limits on successive removals.”  GSK Br. 17.  While the first 
paragraph does not explicitly mention successive removals, as 
GSK notes, it also does not explicitly mention first removals.  
Instead, it uses the general term “[t]he notice of removal,” 
meaning the notice of removal by which the case came before 
the district court, and it is clear that this notice of removal 
must be filed within thirty days of receipt of the initial 
pleading.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  Thus, although paragraph 
one does not expressly forbid successive removals,4 it does 
                                              
4 See Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The 
removal statute does not categorically prohibit the filing of a 
second removal petition following remand.” (quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
10 
 
expressly forbid untimely removals.  Here, the relevant notice 
of removal was untimely: it was filed over a year and a half 
after GSK was served with the initial pleading, namely the 
state court complaint.  App. 31, 46-47.  Because GSK’s 
second removal occurred more than thirty days after its 
receipt of the initial pleading, it did not comply with the first 
paragraph and GSK cannot remove on that basis.   
 
B 
 
 The second paragraph does not relieve GSK of the first 
paragraph’s bar.  It is an exception to the thirty-day time limit 
in the first paragraph.  This paragraph sets a separate thirty-
day time limit that applies when: (1) “the case stated by the 
initial pleading is not removable” and (2) the defendant 
receives “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” 
(3) from which “it may first be ascertained that the case is one 
which is or has become removable.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  In 
diversity cases, the second paragraph has a fourth 
requirement: removal may not occur “more than 1 year after 
the commencement of the action.”  Id.  We will address the 
relevant requirements in turn. 
 
1 
 
 Even assuming the case stated by the initial pleading 
was not removable, GSK also cannot rely on the second 
paragraph because there was no “amended pleading, motion, 
order or other paper” to trigger its thirty-day time limit.  In 
general, the terms “amended pleading, motion, order or other 
paper” only “address[] developments within a case” and, 
therefore, court decisions in different cases do not count as an 
“order.”  Dahl v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965, 
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969 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Green v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 274 F.3d 263, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).  
This is because: (1) “[i]f Congress had intended new 
developments in the law to trigger the recommencement of 
the thirty day time limit, it could have easily added language 
making it clear that § 1446(b) was not only addressing 
developments within a case” and (2) the fact that the 
documents are “listed in a logical sequence in the 
development of an individual case” makes it “an unsupported 
stretch to interpret ‘order’ to include a decision in a separate 
case with different parties.”  Dahl, 478 F.3d at 969. 
 
 Our Court has recognized a narrow exception to the 
general rule that orders issued in other cases do not qualify as 
a § 1446(b)  “order.”  In Doe v. American Red Cross, the Red 
Cross removed a case on the ground that its Congressional 
charter conferred federal question jurisdiction.  14 F.3d at 
197-99.  The district court disagreed and remanded the case.  
Id. at 199.  Next, the Supreme Court decided S.G. v. 
American National Red Cross, 505 U.S. 247 (1992), which 
held that the Red Cross’s charter conferred federal question 
jurisdiction and gave the “specific and unequivocal direction 
that the Red Cross [was] ‘thereby authorized to removal from 
state to federal court of any state-law action it is defending.’”  
Doe, 14 F.3d at 201 (quoting S.G., 505 U.S. at 248)).   
 
 The Red Cross re-removed the case within thirty days 
of S.G. and plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing, among other 
things, that S.G. was not an “order” under § 1446(b)’s second 
paragraph.  The Doe Court disagreed, holding that S.G. was 
an “order,” but it included an important qualification.  To 
qualify as an “order” under § 1446(b), a court decision in 
another case “must be sufficiently related to a pending case,” 
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meaning that: (1) “the order in the case came from a court 
superior in the same judicial hierarchy”; (2) “was directed at a 
particular defendant”; and (3) “expressly authorized that same 
defendant to remove an action against it in another case 
involving similar facts and legal issues.”  Id. at 202-03.  It 
was this last requirement that made S.G. “unique.”  Id.  
According to Doe, S.G. was not “simply . . . an order 
emanating from an unrelated action.”  Id. at 202.  Rather, it 
was “an unequivocal order directed to a party to the pending 
litigation, explicitly authorizing it to remove any cases it is 
defending.”  Id.   
 
 Johnson is no S.G.  Johnson rejected the reasoning that 
led to the remand of this case, as it held that GSK is a 
Delaware citizen, but it did not include the explicit 
authorization to remove other pending cases.  Put simply, 
“Johnson . . . merely affirmed” an “[order denying] remand in 
the case before it.”  Powell, 2013 WL 5377852, at *4.  
Accordingly, Johnson does not qualify as an “order” under 
Doe. 
 
 In an attempt to extend Doe, GSK cites to a pair of 
non-binding cases for the proposition that this Court can 
ignore Doe’s third requirement.  See Green, 274 F.3d 263; 
Young v. Chubb Grp. of Ins. Comp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 806 
(N.D. Ohio 2003).  These courts held that a decision in 
another case qualified as an “order” under § 1446(b) even 
though the decision did “not explicitly discuss removal,” 
much less specifically authorize removal in pending cases.  
Green, 274 F.3d at 268; see Young, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 808.  
In effect, GSK wants this Court to rely on these cases and 
hold that any subsequent decision involving the same 
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defendant impacting removability is an “order” under 
§ 1446(b). 
 
 Our binding precedent in Doe made clear, however, 
that its ruling was narrow and meant to apply in “unique 
circumstances,” namely compliance with a higher court’s 
holding that explicitly authorized a particular party to remove 
all of its pending cases to federal court.  Doe, 14 F.3d at 202-
03.  To treat all subsequent decisions involving the same 
defendant as part of a specific pending case would move the 
Doe rule from the “unique” to the typical.   
 
 Moreover, if a party in a pending case could re-remove 
each time it received a favorable ruling in another case, re-
removal could be a means to disrupt the proceedings in the 
pending case.  Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference 
Athletic Ass’n, 668 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that 
one of the purposes of removal time limits is “prevent[ing] 
the delay and waste of resources involved in starting a case 
over in a second court after significant proceedings . . . may 
have taken place in the first court”).  For these reasons, Doe is 
appropriately limited to the “unique circumstances” that arose 
in that case and we decline to expand the definition of “order” 
to include orders entered in any case involving the same 
defendant.5  
 
 Because Johnson did not explicitly direct removal of 
all cases involving GSK, but only affirmed the order denying 
                                              
5 This conclusion is consistent with our precedent that 
removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal.  
See, e.g., Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 
29 (3d Cir. 1985).   
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remand of the case, it is not an “order” that triggers a new 
thirty-day time period to remove Plaintiffs’ case.  For this 
additional reason, the second paragraph of § 1446(b) does not 
provide a basis for removal.  
 
2 
 
 GSK is also barred from removal based upon the 
second paragraph’s one-year limitation, which prohibits 
removal of diversity cases more than one year after the case 
commences.  Here, the case commenced on September 30, 
2011, and the notice of removal at issue was filed on June 26, 
2013, more than a year and a half later.  App. 18-19. 
 
 This one-year time limit is procedural, not 
jurisdictional.  Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 351 F.3d 
611, 616 (3d Cir. 2003).  For that reason, the time limit may 
be equitably tolled in certain circumstances.  See Tedford v. 
Warner–Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing equitable tolling exception to the one-year 
removal limitation); Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 
584, 591 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a non-jurisdictional time 
limitation “may be modified by equitable concerns, such as 
tolling”). 
 
 Equitable tolling is not warranted in this case.  Cases 
involving equitable tolling of the one-year time limit often 
focus on intentional misconduct by the plaintiff.  See e.g., 
Tedford, 327 F.3d at 428-29 (“Where a plaintiff has 
attempted to manipulate the statutory rules for determining 
federal removal jurisdiction, thereby preventing the defendant 
from exercising its rights, equity may require that the one-
year limit in § 1446(b) be extended.”); Namey v. Malcolm, 
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534 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that 
equitable exception to one-year limitation did not apply 
because “Defendants have not met their burden of 
demonstrating sufficient culpability on the part of Plaintiffs”).  
At the time this case was commenced, equitable tolling also 
may have been proper for reasons other than party 
misconduct.6  See Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 56 F. 
Supp. 2d 859, 865 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (equitably tolling first 
paragraph’s thirty-day time limit to allow re-removal where 
initial removal notice “simply disappeared,” even though 
plaintiffs had not “engaged in behavior which might estop 
them from pursuit of remand”), rev’d on other grounds, 258 
F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 
 While the contours of equitable tolling vary from 
context to context, this Court and the Supreme Court have 
held that equitable tolling may be appropriate if a litigant can 
demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood 
in his way.”  Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) 
(habeas case); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 
38 F.3d 1380, 1387, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding time limit 
to file an EEOC charge may be tolled “where the plaintiff in 
some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting 
his or her rights” but noting that a “plaintiff who fails to 
exercise this reasonable diligence may lose the benefit of 
[equitable tolling]”).   
                                              
6 The current version of § 1446 specifically states that a 
diversity case cannot be removed “more than 1 year after the 
commencement of the action, unless the district court finds 
that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a 
defendant from removing the action.” 28 U.S.C.§ 1446 (c)(1). 
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 GSK argues that “extraordinary circumstances 
thwarted [its] initial removal.”  GSK Br. 36.  According to 
GSK, the “extraordinary circumstances” were: (1) that the 
remand proceedings were consolidated before a judge who 
had previously held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania 
and therefore was likely to find that remand was proper; and 
(2) that the District Court erroneously remanded the case.   
 
 Neither is an “extraordinary circumstance.”  Section 
137 of Title 28 provides that “[t]he business of a court having 
more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as 
provided by the rules and orders of the court.”  This statute 
“vests the district court with broad discretion in assigning 
court business to individual judges.” United States v. Diaz, 
189 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999).  Simply put, under that 
statute, litigants “do[ ] not have a right to have [their] case 
heard by a particular judge,” have “no right to any particular 
procedure for the selection of the judge,” and “do[ ] not enjoy 
the right to have the judge selected by a random draw.”  
United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 
2000) (citations and alteration omitted) (collecting cases).  
Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), 
district courts have “broad power” to consolidate cases that 
share “common question[s] of law or fact.”  Ellerman Lines, 
Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d 
Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 176 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court has “broad 
discretion in its rulings concerning case management”). 
   
 Applying these principles here, it is clear that GSK had 
no right to have its motion decided by a particular judge nor 
was it prejudiced by the assignment of this case to a judge 
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who ruled against it.  The decision to consolidate the nearly-
identical cases before a judge familiar with the relevant issues 
was a proper exercise of the District Court’s broad discretion.  
There was nothing “extraordinary” about the decision to 
consolidate the cases.     
 
 Furthermore, although the original remand decision 
was wrong, an erroneous remand is not an “extraordinary 
circumstance.”  In fact, § 1447(d)’s prohibition on review of 
remand orders “contemplates that district courts may err in 
remanding cases.”  Feidt, 153 F.3d at 128.  A circumstance 
expressly “contemplate[d]” by the statutory scheme is not 
extraordinary, but is expected.   Id.  Moreover, as one district 
court has persuasively observed, subsequent legal 
developments “are precisely the sort of events that 
§ 1446(b)’s one-year limitations period is designed to 
preclude” from disrupting a pending case.  Williams v. Nat’l 
Heritage Realty Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 595, 597 (N.D. Miss. 
2007).  Otherwise, “removal issues would be subject to 
constant re-litigation” as the law develops.  Id.   
 
 For these reasons, GSK is not entitled to equitable 
tolling. 
 
C 
 
  GSK’s final argument is that its second notice of 
removal should “relate back” to the first notice of removal.  
To assess this argument, we must first identify the source of a 
court’s authority to relate back in this context.  GSK relies on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).  Rule 15, however, 
only applies to an “amendment to a pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(c).  Rule 7(a) lists the types of “pleadings” and a notice of 
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removal is not among them.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).  
Therefore, any relation back in this case must be justified—if 
at all—under a court’s equitable powers.  See Scarborough v. 
Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 417-18 (2004) (noting that “relation 
back” is an equitable doctrine that can apply outside of Rule 
15 context).   
 
 GSK argues that this case “warrants the exercise of 
those equitable powers.”  GSK Br. 30.  The reasons GSK 
gives in favor of equitable relation back simply rehash its 
arguments for equitable tolling and for the same reasons, they 
fail.  Neither the fact that a particular judge was assigned to 
the case nor the error in remanding the case provide a basis 
for equitable relief.  
 
 An additional reason dictates that the second notice of 
removal does not relate back to the first notice of removal.  
By the time GSK filed its second notice of removal, a final 
order remanding the action had been filed and the case was 
sent to the state court.  As a result, there was nothing pending 
in the federal court to which the second notice could relate.  
This distinguishes the present case with those that GSK cites 
as supporting relation back, such as USX Corp. v. Adriatic 
Insurance Co., 345 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003).  In USX, the 
defendant timely removed to federal court and the plaintiff 
filed a motion to remand, which the district court denied.  Id. 
at 197.  While the case was pending in federal court, the 
Supreme Court issued a decision that undercut the rationale 
for jurisdiction in the defendant’s notice of removal and the 
plaintiff filed another motion to remand.  Id. at 199-200.  The 
defendant offered a new explanation for jurisdiction, and the 
district court denied remand based on the new explanation.  
Id.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s new 
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argument was waived because it was not included in the 
notice of removal.  Id. at 200.  This Court held that the 
argument was not waived because the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by deeming that the new argument 
“amended” the notice of removal.  Id. at 204-05.  This was 
proper, the USX Court reasoned, because the new argument 
“did not add new jurisdictional facts and did not rely on a 
basis of jurisdiction different from that originally alleged.”  
Id. at 205.  Instead, it only “amend[ed] the allegation [in the 
notice of removal] in light of an intervening clarification in 
the law.”  Id.  For support, this Court cited cases holding that 
amendments to removal notices may be permitted so long as 
the amendments “merely clarify (or correct technical 
deficiencies in) the allegations already contained in the 
original notice.”  Id. at 205 n.12.  The Court distinguished 
USX’s situation from cases where an amendment “creat[es] 
an entirely new basis for jurisdiction.”  Id. at 205 n.11. 
 
 There is a critical difference between this case and 
USX.  In this case, GSK’s first notice of removal was not 
pending but was disposed of by a final order remanding the 
case to state court.  See In re FMC Corp. Packaging Sys. Div., 
208 F.3d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that remand orders 
are final orders).  That order divested the district court of 
jurisdiction over the case.  Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 
1079, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992).  There was therefore nothing for 
the second notice of removal to “relate back” to.  In USX, by 
contrast, the notice of removal was still pending and therefore 
there was a notice of removal to which to relate back. 
 
 Recognizing this obvious distinction, GSK argues that 
the initial notice does not need to be pending, but rather that 
only the underlying case must be pending.  For this 
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proposition, GSK cites to cases where courts allowed an 
amended complaint to relate back to a timely, yet dismissed 
complaint.  These cases allowed relation back only when the 
complaint was dismissed without prejudice—i.e., by a non-
final order.7  See Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 607 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (permitting amendment to dismissed complaint 
when dismissal was without prejudice); see also Luevano v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(permitting amended complaint to relate back to dismissed 
complaint when dismissal was without prejudice).  As a 
result, each dismissal was “conditional” and the district court 
“retained jurisdiction over the case” even after dismissal.  
Brennan, 407 F.3d at 607.  Here, the District Court’s first 
remand order was final, not “conditional,” and ended the 
federal case.   
 
 Moreover, once an order remanding a case is mailed to 
the state court, the district court loses jurisdiction and thus 
lacks the authority to allow the amendment of the notice of 
removal.  In Hunt, a district court remanded a case to state 
court, thereby losing jurisdiction over the case.  961 F.2d at 
                                              
7 The one case GSK cites that involved a dismissal with 
prejudice does not warrant a different view.  In Donnelly v. 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989), aff’d 
on other grounds, 494 U.S. 820 (1990), the appellate court 
allowed relation back to a complaint that was dismissed in 
state court with prejudice.  Id. at 410 n.11.  The appellate 
court treated the order as being without prejudice and allowed 
relation back, concluding that the state order “utterly makes 
no sense” because (1) it should have been a dismissal without 
prejudice and (2) another state court order implied that the 
plaintiff could amend her complaint.  Id. at 410 & n.11.     
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1081.  After remand, the defendant filed a motion to amend 
its notice of removal, but this Court held that the motion to 
amend was “too late” since the district court no longer had 
jurisdiction over the case.  Id. at 1082.  The Hunt Court noted 
that this result furthered “the policy underlying [§ 1447(d)],” 
which is “to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by 
avoiding protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues of 
exactly the type involved here.”  Id.  The result should be no 
different here, where GSK essentially seeks to amend its first 
notice of removal with its second notice of removal.  
Allowing a second notice of removal to do what a motion 
could not would be an end run around both the holding in 
Hunt and the policy underlying § 1447(d).      
 
 For all of these reasons, GSK’s second notice of 
removal cannot relate back to the first notice of removal.8 
                                              
8 Plaintiffs also contend that § 1447(d) is an alternative 
ground for reversing the District Court’s denial of remand.  
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that a denial of the motion to 
remand after the District Court had remanded the case was 
effectively a “review” of a remand order not permitted under 
§ 1447(d).  Doe, however, provides that re-removals on 
“different” grounds are not barred by § 1447(d).  Doe, 14 
F.3d at 200.  Under Doe, “different” grounds include a 
citation to “a new and definitive source” of authority.  Id.  
Johnson was such “a new and definitive source” of authority.  
While there are distinctions between Doe’s S.G. and this 
case’s Johnson, those distinctions are only relevant to 
§1446(b)’s “order” inquiry, which is distinct from § 1447(d).  
Put differently, Johnson’s status as a non-“order” does not 
make it any less of “a new and definitive source” of authority.  
Accordingly, the second notice of removal, with its citation to 
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IV 
 
 Because GSK’s second removal was untimely under § 
1446(b), we will reverse and remand with instructions that the 
District Court remand this case to the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas. 
                                                                                                     
Johnson, set forth a “different” ground as defined in Doe.  
Therefore, the District Court’s order denying remand after it 
had entered an order granting remand did not run afoul of 
§1447(d).   
